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Distributed robust seeking of Nash equilibrium for networked games:
an extended-state observer based approach
Maojiao Ye
Abstract—This paper aims to accommodate games in which
the players’ dynamics are subject to un-modeled and dis-
turbance terms. The un-modeled and disturbance terms are
regarded as extended states for which observers are designed
to estimate them. Compensating the players’ dynamics with the
observed values, the control laws are designed to achieve the
robust seeking of the Nash equilibrium for networked games.
Firstly, we consider the case in which the players’ dynamics are
subject to bounded disturbances only. In this case, the seeking
strategy is developed by employing a smooth observer based on
the Proportional-Integral (PI) control. By utilizing the designed
strategy, we show that the players’ actions would converge to
a small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the
ultimate bound can be adjusted to be arbitrarily small by tuning
the control gains. Then, we further consider the case in which
both an un-modeled term and a disturbance term coexist in
the players’ dynamics. In this case, we adapt the idea from
the Robust Integral of the Sign of the Error (RISE) method
in the strategy design to achieve the asymptotic seeking of the
Nash equilibrium. Both strategies are analytically investigated
via the Lyapunov stability analysis. The applications of the
proposed methods for a network of velocity-actuated vehicles
are discussed. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed methods
is verified via conducting numerical simulations.
Index Terms—robust Nash equilibrium seeking, un-modeled
and disturbance term, extended-state, distributed networks
I. INTRODUCTION
More and more researchers have begun to explore the Nash
equilibrium computation for networked games, especially
in recent years (see e.g., [1]-[9] for more comprehensive
reviews). The main motivations for their efforts lie in
both the wide applications of noncooperative games and
their enormous potential to be adapted for the coordinative
control and optimization of networked systems. The main
focuses of the existing works are on algorithm developments,
communication issues and tackling the constraints of the
games in which the players are of first-order integrator-type
dynamics. Nevertheless, the system dynamics exhibit much
more complex characteristics in many engineering systems.
In many practical situations, the dynamics of the plants
are subject to un-modeled terms and disturbances (e.g.,
Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) gyroscope [10],
physical hydraulic systems [11], air hybrid vehicles [12],
the pneumatic muscle actuator systems [13] and marine
surface vessels [14], just to name a few). For example, due
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to external disturbance and imprecise microfabrication, the
control strategy designed for the MEMS gyroscope should
take the parameter variations, the mechanical-thermal noises
and the axes mechanical couplings into account [10]. To
compensate for the effects of imprecise microfabrication and
external disturbance, an Active Disturbance Rejection Con-
trol (ADRC) based strategy was adapted for the control of
MEMS gyroscope in [10]. Moreover, physical hydraulic sys-
tems were trapped by uncertain parameters (e.g., hydraulic
and payload unknown parameters) and external disturbances
[11]. Gear shifting and tank pressure resulted in disturbance
and varying parameters in the regenerative braking torque
control of the air hybrid vehicles [12]. Moreover, it’s a
challenging task to get the accurate model information for
the pneumatic muscle actuators. To address the un-modeled
complexities, an ADRC-based control strategy was proposed
for the pneumatic muscle actuator systems in [13]. Hydro-
dynamic damping forces and the working environments, that
the autonomous marine surface vessels suffer, gave rise to
un-modeled dynamics and unpredictable disturbances for the
tracking control of marine surface vessels [14]. Motivated
by the fact that un-modeled dynamics and disturbances
are practically ubiquitous, this paper considers the robust
Nash equilibrium computation for games in which there are
un-modeled dynamics and time-varying disturbances in the
players’ dynamics.
Robust Nash equilibrium seeking problems were con-
sidered in [7][8][9]. The authors in [7] considered Nash
equilibrium computation for generalized convex games. In
particular, the robustness of the Nash equilibrium computing
method towards the changes of the network topologies as
well as the transmission delays was investigated. However,
the players were considered to be static players whose action
updating strategies can be arbitrarily designed. In [8], the ro-
bustness of the consensus-based Nash computation algorithm
towards the switching of the communication topology among
the players was explored. In addition, robust analysis for the
loss of communication was conducted. Given that the lengths
of the time slots, in which the communication among the
players was lost, were bounded by certain value, the method
can still achieve Nash seeking under certain conditions [8]. In
[9], we investigated the robustness of the Nash equilibrium
computation method towards bounded disturbances. It was
proven in [9] that by utilizing the real-time measurements
of the players’ payoff values, the designed method ensured
that the equilibrium point was ultimately bounded. Noticing
that each player’s objective function might be determined by
all the engaged players’ actions, we investigate distributed
robust Nash equilibrium computation in which the players
are supposed to have restrictive accesses into the other
players’ actions.
Compared with the distributed seeking algorithms in [1],
this paper accommodates the un-modeled complexities and
time-varying disturbances in the system dynamics. The un-
modeled dynamics bring couplings among all the players’
dynamics, thus making the problem much more challeng-
ing. Moreover, the closed-loop system becomes a non-
autonomous system under time-varying disturbances while
the closed-loop systems in [1] are autonomous. Besides, this
paper differs from [9] as only local communication among
the players is required in the proposed methods, which
benefits their applications in distributed systems. In addition,
only a bounded disturbance term was addressed in [9] while
in this paper, we consider both time-varying disturbances
and un-modeled dynamics. In contrast to the bounded con-
vergence result in [9], this paper proposes a method that can
achieve robust asymptotic equilibrium seeking in distributed
networks. In summary, the main contributions of the paper
are given in threefold:
1) The robust Nash equilibrium seeking problem is con-
sidered for games under distributed communication
networks. In the considered problem, there exist un-
modeled complexities and time-varying disturbances
in the players’ dynamics. In the proposed methods,
the uncertainties in the system dynamics are regarded
as extended states, for which a PI-based observer
and a RISE-based observer are adapted. Based on
the designed observers, two distributed robust Nash
equilibrium seeking strategies are established.
2) The convergence results are theoretically established
via conducting Lyapunov stability analysis. It is shown
that driven by the PI-based algorithm, the players’
actions would converge to a neighborhood of the equi-
librium point. Moreover, the ultimate bound can be ad-
justed to be arbitrarily small by tuning the parameters.
For the RISE-based method, it is theoretically proven
that asymptotic convergence results are obtained.
3) The applications of the proposed methods for a net-
work of velocity-actuated vehicles are discussed. In
particular, the convergence results for the connectivity
control game among the mobile sensors are estab-
lished.
We proceed the remainder of the paper in the following
order. The preliminaries and notations are given in Section
II. The problem is formulated in Section III. The main
results are given in Section IV, where a PI-based method
and a RISE-based method are developed. The applications
of the proposed methods in sensors networks are discussed
in Section V. A numerical example is given in Section VI for
the verification of the proposed methods and the conclusions
are drawn in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
In this paper, we use G = (V , Ed) to denote a communi-
cation graph. Note that V = {1, 2, · · · ,M}, where M ≥ 2
and is an integer, defines the set of nodes in the graph and
Ed defines the set of edges for the nodes. The elements of Ed
are (i, j), which represents for an edge from node i to node
j. Associate with (i, j) ∈ Ed a weight aji > 0 and aii = 0.
If aij = aji, ∀i, j ∈ V , we say that G is undirected. A matrix
with its element on the ith row and jth column being aij
(aij > 0 if (j, i) ∈ Ed, else, aij = 0) is the adjacency matrix
of graph G and is termed as A. Given that there is a path
between any pair of distinct vertices, the undirected graph is
connected. Define D as a diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal
element is
∑M
j=1 aij . Then, the Laplacian matrix L is equal
to D −A [1][19].
Notations: The concatenated vector form of hi for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} is denoted as [hi]vec. Similarly, [hij ]vec
(diag{hij}) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}
is defined as a vector (diagonal matrix) whose elements
(diagonal elements) are h11, h12, · · · , h1M , h21, · · · , hNM ,
successively. The minimum and maximum eigenvalues of a
symmetric positive definite matrix P are denoted as λmin(P )
and λmax(P ), respectively. Moreover, the minimum element
and maximum element of hi for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} are
denoted asmin{hi} andmax{hi}, respectively. The notation
min{a, b} = a(max{a, b} = b) if a ≤ b. Else, min{a, b} =
b(max{a, b} = a).
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider a game with N players in which
player i intends to
minxi fi(x)
subject to x˙i = ui + ςgi(x) + di(t),
(1)
where xi ∈ R, ui and fi(x) are the action, the control
input and the objective function of player i, respectively.
Moreover, x = [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]T . Note that gi(x) and di(t)
respectively denote the un-modeled term and the external
disturbance whose explicit expressions are unknown. The
parameter ς is equal to 0 or 1. In the rest of the paper, these
two cases will be investigated successively. The paper aims
to design the control inputs to achieve the robust computation
of the Nash equilibrium under the conditions that each player
can not directly access all the other players’ actions and the
pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Note that Nash equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1: An action profile (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) is a Nash equi-
librium if for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N},
fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi,x∗−i), (2)
for xi ∈ R [1].
Remark 1: In this paper,
x˙i = ui + ςgi(x) + di(t), (3)
where ς = 0 or ς = 1. In contrast,
x˙i = ui, (4)
in [1]. Note that in (3), gi(x) is an un-modeled term whose
explicit expression is unknown and di(t) is an unknown time-
varying disturbance. Moreover, as gi(x) is a function of x, it
brings couplings among the players’ dynamics thus making
the problem more challenging.
Adopted from [1][3], the subsequent commonly used
assumptions will be utilized in the upcoming sections.
Assumption 1: For each i, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, fi(x) is a
C2 function.
Assumption 2: There exists a positive constant m such
that for x, z ∈ RN ,
(x− z)T (Υ(x)−Υ(z)) ≥ m||x− z||2, (5)
where Υ(x) =
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]T
vec
.
Assumption 3: The players are equipped with an undi-
rected and connected communication graph G.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we firstly consider the case in which the
players’ dynamics are subject to external disturbance only,
followed by the case in which the players’ dynamics are
subject to both an un-modeled term and a disturbance term.
A. Strategy design with a smooth state observer
In this section, we concern with games in which player
i’s action is given by
x˙i = ui + di(t), (6)
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
The disturbance term di(t) is supposed to satisfy the
following condition.
Assumption 4: The disturbance term di(t) is continuously
differentiable and d˙i(t) is bounded for t ∈ (t0,∞), i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}.
To further proceed to the strategy design, let zi = di(t).
Then, the dynamics of player i can be written as
x˙i =ui + zi
z˙i =d˙i(t).
(7)
By regarding the external disturbance as an extended-state,
the control law is designed as
ui = − ∂fi
∂xi
(yi)− zˆi, (8)
in which
∂fi
∂xi
(yi) =
∂fi(x)
∂xi
|x=yi , yi = [yi1, yi2, · · · , yiN ]T
and yij , zˆi are generated by
y˙ij =− θij(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − xj))
˙ˆxi =ui + zˆi + k¯i1(xi − xˆi)
˙ˆzi =k¯i2(xi − xˆi).
(9)
Moreover, k¯i1 = σki1, k¯i2 = σ
2ki2, θij = θθ¯ij where σ, θ
are positive parameters to be determined and θij , ki1, ki2 are
fixed positive constants.
Remark 2: As the players’ dynamics are subject to time-
varying disturbances, the main idea is to employ an observer
to estimate the disturbance and then compensate it in the
control law. Hence, zˆi can be regarded as the observed
disturbance. Moreover, as the players do not have direct
access into the actions of the players who are not their
neighbors, this paper follows our previous works in [1][3]
to estimate the requested information by utilizing consensus
protocols.
Define
ζi1 = xi − xˆi
ζi2 = zi − zˆi
ξi = xi − x∗i
ηij = yij − xj ,
(10)
then,
ζ˙i1 = xi − xˆi
= −k¯i1ζi1 + ζi2
ζ˙i2 = zi − zˆi
= −k¯i2ζi1 + d˙i(t)
ξ˙i = xi − x∗i
= − ∂fi
∂xi
(yi) + ζi2
η˙ij = y˙ij − x˙j
= −θij(
N∑
k=1
aik(ηij − ηkj) + aijηij)− x˙j .
(11)
Hence,
ζ˙1 = −σk1ζ1 + ζ2
ζ˙2 = −σ2k2ζ1 + d˙(t)
η˙ = −θΘ¯(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)η − 1N ⊗ x˙
ξ˙ = −
[
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
]
vec
+ ζ2,
(12)
where k1 = diag{ki1},k2 = diag{ki2},d(t) =
[di(t)]vec, ζ1 = [ζi1]vec, ζ2 = [ζi2]vec,η = [ηij ]vec, ξ =
[ξi]vec, Θ¯ = diag{θ¯ij}, A0 = diag{aij} and IN×N is an
identity matrix of dimension N ×N.
Define ζ = [ζT1 , ζ
T
2 ]
T , then
ζ˙ = −∆ζ + d1(t), (13)
where ∆ =
[
σk1 −IN×N
σ2k2 0N×N
]
and d1(t) = [0
T
N , d˙(t)
T ]T .
The following lemma is given for further facilitation of
the closed-loop system analysis.
Lemma 1: The matrix Ξ =
[ −ki1 1
−ki2 0
]
is Hurwitz.
Proof: To facilitate the proof, let
w˙1 = −ki1w1 + w2
w˙2 = −ki2w1,
(14)
where w1, w2 ∈ R are the system states.
Moreover, define
V =
1
2
w21 +
1
2ki2
w22 . (15)
Then,
V˙ = w1(−ki1w1 + w2)− w2w1 = −ki1w21 . (16)
Hence, V˙ ≤ 0 and V˙ = 0 if and only if w1 = 0. Recalling
that
w˙1 = −ki1w1 + w2
w˙2 = −ki2w1,
(17)
we obtain that
w˙1 = w2
w˙2 = 0,
(18)
at V˙ = 0.
Therefore, V˙ = 0 if and only if w1 = 0 and w2 = 0, which
indicates that the origin is globally asymptotically stable for
the system in (14). Hence, by Theorem 4.5 in [18], the matrix
Ξ is Hurwitz.
Based on Lemma 1, the following result can be obtained.
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied.
Then, for any positive constants v1, v2, there exists a pos-
itive constant θ∗(v1, v2), σ
∗(v1, v2) such that for each θ ∈
(θ∗,∞), σ ∈ (σ∗,∞), there exists T¯ ≥ t0 such that for
t ≥ T¯ ,
||E(t)|| ≤ v2, (19)
given that ||E(t0)|| ≤ v1, where E = [ζT ,ηT , ξT ]T and t0
is the initial time instant.
Proof: Define ζ¯1 = ζ1, ζ¯2 =
ζ
2
σ
. Then, it follows from
(13) that
˙¯ζ = −σ∆¯ζ¯ + d1(t)
σ
, (20)
where ζ¯ = [ζT1 , ζ
T
2 ]
T and ∆¯ =
[
k1 −IN×N
k2 0N×N
]
. Note
that −∆¯ is Hurwitz if any only if
[ −ki1 1
−ki2 0
]
for all i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} are Hurwitz. Therefore, −∆¯ is Hurwitz by
Lemma 1 and there exist symmetric positive definite matrices
P1, Q1 such that
P1∆¯ + ∆¯
TP1 = Q1, (21)
according to Theorem 4.6 in [18].
According to (20), the evolution of ζ¯ is independent of η
and ξ. Hence, define
V1 = ζ¯
T
P1ζ¯. (22)
Then, there exists a positive constant l1 such that
V˙1 =− σζ¯TQ1ζ¯ + 2ζ¯
T
P1d1(t)
σ
≤− σλmin(Q1)||ζ¯||2 + l1
σ
||ζ¯||||d1(t)||.
(23)
By further noticing that
λmin(P1)||ζ¯||2 ≤ V1 ≤ λmax(P1)||ζ¯||2, (24)
it follows from Theorem 4.19 in [18] that
||ζ¯(t)|| ≤β¯(||ζ¯(t0)||, σ(t− t0))
+
2l1λmax(P1)
σ2λmin(P1)λmin(Q1)
supt≥t0 ||d1(t)||,
(25)
where β¯ ∈ KL.
Hence, for any l2 >
2l1λmax(P1) supt≥t0 ||d1(t)||
λmin(P1)λmin(Q1)
, there
exists a positive constant T ≥ t0 such that
||ζ¯(t)|| ≤ l2
σ2
, ∀t > T. (26)
Recalling the definition of ζ¯, we can obtain that
||ζ2(t)|| ≤
l2
σ
, ∀t > T. (27)
To analyze the evolution of η and ξ, define
V2 = η
TPη + 1
2
ξT ξ, (28)
and P is a symmetric positive definite matrix that satisfies
P(Θ¯(L ⊗ IN×N +A0)) + (Θ¯(L ⊗ IN×N +A0))TP = Q,
(29)
where Q is a symmetric positive definite matrix [8]. Then,
for φ¯, where φ¯ = [ηT , ξT ]T , that belongs to a sufficiently
large compact set D that contains the origin,
V˙2 ≤− θλmin(Q)||η||2 − 2ηTP1N ⊗ x˙
−m||ξ||2 − ξT
[
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)− ∂fi
∂xi
(x)
]
vec
+ ξT ζ2
≤− θλmin(Q)||η||2 + l3||η||2 + l4||η||||ξ||
+ l5||η||||ζ2|| −m||ξ||2 + l6||ξ||||η||+ ||ξ||||ζ2||,
(30)
where li, ∀i ∈ {3, 4, · · · , 6} are positive constants by utiliz-
ing the conditions in Assumptions 1-2.
Define A1 =
[
θλmin(Q)− l3 − l4+l62
− l4+l62 m
]
. Then,
V˙2 ≤− λmin(A1)||φ¯||2 + l5||η||||ζ2||+ ||ξ||||ζ2||
=− λmin(A1)||φ¯||2 + (l5 + 1)||||φ¯||||ζ2||
(31)
where λmin(A1) > 0 given that θ >
(l4+l6)
2+4ml3
4mλmin(Q)
.
Hence,
V˙2 ≤ −λmin(A1)
2
||φ¯||2, ∀||φ¯|| ≥ 2(l5 + 1)||ζ2||
λmin(A1)
. (32)
Moreover,
min{λmin(P), 1
2
}||φ¯||2 ≤ V2 ≤ max{λmax(P), 1
2
}||φ¯||2.
(33)
Choose r such that Br ∈ D and
2(l5 + 1) supt≥t0 ||ζ2(t)||
λmin(A1)
<
(
min{λmin(P), 12}
)2(
max{λmax(P), 12}
)2 r.
(34)
Then, for ||φ¯(t0)|| ≤ (min{λmin(P),
1
2
})
3
2
(max{λmax(P),
1
2
})
3
2
r, there exists a
T1 ≥ t0 such that for t0 < t ≤ T1,
||φ¯(t)|| ≤
√
max{λmax(P), 12}
min{λmin(P), 12}
||φ¯(t0)|| (35)
and
||φ¯(t)|| ≤max{λmax(P),
1
2}
min{λmin(P), 12}
2(l5 + 1) supt≥0 ||ζ2(t)||
λmin(A1)
,
∀t ≥ T1,
(36)
according to Theorem 4.18 in [18].
Hence, if T ≤ T1, we have
||φ¯(T )|| ≤ ||φ¯(t0)|| ≤
min{λmin(P), 12}
max{λmax(P), 12}
r. (37)
Moreover, if T > T1, we have
||φ¯(T )|| ≤ max{λmax(P),
1
2}
min{λmin(P), 12}
2(l5 + 1) supt≥t0 ||ζ2(t)||
λmin(A1)
≤ min{λmin(P),
1
2}
max{λmax(P), 12}
r.
(38)
Letting T = t0 and utilizing the result in Theorem 4.18
in [18] again, we can conclude that there exists T2 ≥ 0 such
that
||φ¯(t)|| ≤β¯2(||φ¯(T )||, t− T ), ∀T ≤ t ≤ T + T2
||φ¯(t)|| ≤max{λmax(P),
1
2}
min{λmin(P), 12}
2(l5 + 1) supt≥T ||ζ2(t)||
λmin(A1)
∀t ≥ T + T2,
(39)
where β¯2 ∈ KL.
Recalling that for t > T , ||ζ2(t)|| ≤ l2σ , we arrive at the
conclusion.
Following the results in Theorem 1, the following corol-
lary can be derived.
Corollary 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied
and
∂fi(x)
∂xi
for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} are globally Lipschitz.
Then, for any positive constant v1, there exists a positive
constant θ∗, σ∗(v1) such that for each θ ∈ (θ∗,∞), σ ∈
(σ∗,∞), there exists T¯ ≥ t0 such that for t ≥ T¯ ,
||E(t)|| ≤ v1. (40)
Proof: The result can be derived by noticing that if
∂fi(x)
∂xi
for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} are globally Lipschitz, the
proof in Theorem 1 holds for any initial condition.
Remark 3: In Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we establish the
convergence results for the proposed method in (8)-(9) and
show that the proposed method can drive the players’ actions
to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium
by tuning the control parameters. In the following section,
we will propose an asymptotic seeker that can accommodate
both the un-modeled complexities and time-varying distur-
bances in the system dynamics.
B. Strategy design with an asymptotic state observer
In this section, we consider the Nash equilibrium seeking
problem in which
x˙i = ui + gi(x) + di(t). (41)
To accommodate the un-modeled and disturbance term, let
zi = gi(x) + di(t). Then, the dynamics of player i can be
written as
x˙i = ui + zi
z˙i = g˙i(x) + d˙i(t).
(42)
To seek for the Nash equilibrium, let
ui = − ∂fi
∂xi
(yi)− zˆi (43)
in which yi = [yi1, yi2, · · · , yiN ]T . Moreover,
y˙ij = −θij(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − xj))
˙ˆxi = ui + zˆi + (k
s
i + ci)(xi − xˆi)
˙ˆzi = k
s
i ci(xi − xˆi) + βisgn(xi − xˆi),
(44)
where θij = θθ¯ij , θ is a positive control gain to be further
determined and θ¯ij is a fixed control parameter. Moreover,
sgn(·) is the standard signum function and ksi , ci, βi are
positive control gains to be further determined.
Remark 4: The proposed method is motivated by [15] in
which the unknown dynamics and disturbances are observed
based on the RISE method (see, e.g., [15]-[17]). Compared
with the strategy in Section IV-A, we see that the main
difference is that a signum function is further included in
the seeking strategy to achieve better convergence results.
To proceed the subsequent analysis, define the error signals
as
ζi1 = xi − xˆi
ζi2 = zi − zˆi
ξi = xi − x∗i ,
(45)
and
ηij = yij − xj . (46)
Then,
ζ˙i1 =x˙i − ˙ˆxi
=zi − zˆi − (ksi + ci)(xi − xˆi)
=− (ksi + ci)ζi1 + ζi2
ζ˙i2 =z˙i − ˙ˆzi
=g˙i(x) + d˙i(t)− ciksi ζi1 − βisgn(ζi1).
(47)
Moreover,
ξ˙i = x˙i = −
∂fi
∂xi
(yi) + ζi2, (48)
and
ηij = −θij(
N∑
k=1
aik(ηij − ηkj) + aijηij)− x˙j . (49)
Writing the error systems in the concatenated vector form
gives the observation error subsystem as
ζ˙1 =− (ks + c)ζ1 + ζ2
ζ˙2 =− cksζ1 − βsgn(ζ1) + [g˙i(x)]vec + [d˙i(t)]vec,
(50)
the optimization error subsystem as
ξ˙ = −
[
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
]
vec
+ ζ2, (51)
and the consensus error subsystem as
η˙ = −Θ(L⊗ IN×N +A0)η − 1N ⊗ x˙, (52)
where ks = diag{ksi }, c = diag{ci}, β = diag{βi}, ζ1 =
[ζi1]vec, ζ2 = [ζi2]vec, ξ = [ξij ]vec,η = [ηij ]vec,Θ =
diag{θij} and y = [yij ]vec.
To facilitate the subsequent analysis, define a filtered
signal as
γ = ζ˙1 + cζ1. (53)
Then,
γ˙ =− (ks + c)ζ˙1 + ζ˙2 + cζ˙1
=− ksγ − βsgn(ζ1) + [g˙i(x)]vec + [d˙i(t)]vec.
(54)
Assumption 5: The functions gi(x) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
are continuously differentiable. Moreover,
∂gi(x)
∂xj
, ∂
2gi(x)
∂xj∂xk
for
i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} are bounded given that x is bounded.
Moreover, the disturbances di(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} are
sufficiently smooth and d˙i(t), d¨i(t) are bounded for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}, t ≥ t0.
Denote Ef = [ζT1 , ζT2 ,ηT ,γT ]T . Then, the following
theorem can be obtained.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 and 5 are
satisfied. Then, for any positive constant v1, there exists a
θ∗(v1) > 0 such that for each θ ∈ (θ∗,∞), there exists a pos-
itive constant cr(v1, θ) such that for each ci ∈ (cr,∞), there
exist positive constants βr(v1, θ, c), k
r
s(v1, θ, c) such that for
each βi ∈ (βr,∞), ksi ∈ (krs ,∞), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N},
Ef (t)→ 0 as t→∞ (55)
given that ||Ef (t0)|| ≤ v1.
Proof: To facilitate the closed-loop system analysis,
define
V = V1 + V2 + V3 + V3 + V5 (56)
where V1 =
1
2ζ
T
1 ζ1, V2 =
1
2γ
Tγ, V3 =
ζT1 (t0)βsgn(ζ1(t0)) − ζT1 (t0)Nc(t0) −
∫ t
t0
(γT (Nc(t) −
βsgn(ζ1)))dτ , Nc(t) = [d˙i(t)]vec V4 =
1
2ξ
T
ξ, and
V5 = η
TPη.
Then,
V˙1 =ζ
T
1 (−(ks + c)ζ1 + ζ2)
=− ζT1 (ks + c)ζ1 + ζT1 ζ2,
(57)
and
V˙2 =γ
T
(
−ksγ − βsgn(ζ1) + [g˙i(x)]vec + [d˙i(t)]vec
)
=− γTksγ
+ γT (−βsgn(ζ1) + [g˙i(x)]vec + [d˙i(t)]vec).
(58)
Moreover, for Ef that belongs to a compact set D that
contains the origin,
V˙3 = −γT (Nc(t)− βsgn(ζ1)), (59)
and
V˙4 =ξ
T
([
− ∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
]
vec
+ ζ2
)
≤−m||ξ||2 + l1||ξ||||η||+ ||ξ||||ζ2||,
(60)
for some positive constant l1 based on Assumption 1.
Furthermore,
V˙5 =− ηTQη − 2ηTP1N ⊗ x˙
≤− θλmin(Q)||η||2 − 2ηTP1N ⊗ x˙
≤− θλmin(Q)||η||2 + l2||η||2
+ l3||η||ξ||+ l4||η||||ζ2||,
(61)
for some positive constants l2, l3 and l4 based on Assumption
1.
Therefore, for Ef that belongs to the compact set,
V˙ ≤− ζT1 (c+ ks)ζ1 + ζT1 ζ2 − λmin(ks)||γ||2
−m||ξ||2 + l1||ξ||||η|| − θλmin(Q)||η||2
+ l2||η||2 + l3||η||ξ||+ l4||η||||ζ2||+ l5||γ||||η||
+ l5||γ||||ξ||+ l6||γ||||ζ2||+ ||ξ||||ζ2||,
(62)
by noticing that for Ef that belongs to the compact set,
∂gi(x)
∂xj
for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} are bounded according
to Assumption 5, and there are positive constant l5, l6 such
that
γT [g˙i(x)]vec = γ
T
[
∂gi(x)
∂x
]T
vec
x˙
≤ l5||γ||||η||+ l5||γ||||ξ||+ l6||γ||||ζ2||.
(63)
Noticing that γ = ζ˙1 + cζ, we have,
γ =ζ˙1 + cζ1
=− ksζ1 + ζ2.
(64)
Therefore,
ζ2 = γ + ksζ1. (65)
Define A1 =
[
m − l1+l32
− l1+l32 θλmin(Q)− l2
]
and choose
θ > (l1+l3)
2+4ml2
4mλmin(Q)
, then,
V˙ ≤− λmin(c)ζT1 ζ1 − (λmin(ks)− l6)||γ||2
− λmin(A1)||φ||2 + (l4 + 1)||φ||||γ||
+ ||ζ1||||γ||+max{ksi }(l4 + 1)||φ||||ζ1||
+ l5||γ||||η||+ l5||γ||||ξ||+ l6||γ||||ksζ1||
(66)
where φ = [ξT ,ηT ]T .
Therefore,
V˙ ≤−
(
λmin(c)− 1
2
− (max{k
s
i })2(l4 + 1)
2ǫ1
− l6max{k
s
i }2
2ǫ3
)
||ζ1||2
−
(
λmin(ks)− l6 − 1
2
− l4 + 1 + 2l5
2ǫ2
− ǫ3l6
2
)
||γ||2
−
(
λmin(A1)− (l4 + 1 + 2l5)ǫ2
2
− ǫ1(l4 + 1)
2
)
||φ||2,
(67)
where ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 are positive constants that can be arbitrarily
chosen.
Hence, choose ǫ1, ǫ2 to be sufficiently small such that
λmin(A1) − (l4+1+2l5)ǫ12 − ǫ2(l4+1)2 > 0 and for fixed
ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 choose k
s
i to be sufficiently large such that
λmin(ks) − 12 − l4+1+2l52ǫ2 − ǫ3l62 > 0. Moreover, for fixed
ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3, ks, choose ci to be sufficiently large such that
λmin(c)− 12 − (max{k
s
i })
2(l4+1)
2ǫ1
− l6 max{ksi }22ǫ3 > 0.
Then, there exists a positive constant ǫ3 such that
V˙ ≤ −ǫ3||ψ||2, (68)
where ψ = [φT , ζT1 ,γ
T ]T .
Moreover, for fixed c, choose βi ≥
|| supt≥t0 [d˙i(t)]vec||1 +
supt≥t0 ||[d¨i(t)]vec||1
min{ci}
, then V3 ≥ 0 by
following the proof of Lemma 5 in [16]. If this is the case,
recalling the definition of V , we have
min{1
2
, λmin(P)}||Ep(t)||2 ≤ V
≤ max{1
2
, λmax(P)}||Ep(t)||2,
(69)
where Ep(t) = [ζT1 ,γT ,
√
V3, ξ
T ,ηT ]T . Furthermore, V˙ is
negative semi-definite and from (68), ψ is bounded for t ∈
[t0,∞). Therefore, according to (65), ζ2 is bounded, from
which we can further conclude that ζ˙1 and ζ˙2 are bounded
according to (50). Moreover, by (54) and (52), we can derive
that γ˙ and η˙ are also bounded. Lastly, by utilizing (51), it’s
easy to verify that x˙ and x¨ are bounded.
Recalling that
V˙ =− ζT1 (ks + c)ζ1 + ζT1 ζ2 − γTksγ
+ ξT
(
−
[
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
]
vec
+ ζ1
)
− ηTQη − 2ηTP1N ⊗ x˙+ γT [g˙i(x)]vec.
(70)
It can be easily verified that V¨ is bounded. Hence, by the
Babalat’s Lemma, ||ψ|| → 0 as t→∞. Recalling that ζ2 =
γ + ksζ1, we arrive at the conclusion.
Remark 5: Compared with the results in Section IV-A,
we see that by utilizing the RISE-based method, asymptotic
convergence results can be obtained though the system
dynamics are subject to both uncertainties (i.e., gi(x)) and
disturbances (i.e., di(t)).
V. APPLICATION TO VELOCITY-ACTUATED MOBILE
SENSOR NETWORKS
In [20], the authors defined a connectivity control game
for a network of mobile sensor networks. By supposing that
the sensors try to find a tradeoff between the local objective
(e.g., source seeking, positioning) and the global objective
(e.g., preserve connectivity with the other sensors), the cost
function of sensor i is defined as [20]
Ji(x) = l
c
i (xi) + l¯
g
i (x), (71)
where
lci (xi) = x
T
i riixi + x
T
i ri + bi, (72)
and
l¯gi (x) =
∑
j∈Ni
cij ||xi − xj ||2. (73)
Moreover, xi = [xi1, xi2]
T ∈ R2 denotes the position of
sensor i, rii, ri, bi, cij are constant matrix or vectors of
compatible dimension and Ni denotes the neighboring set of
sensor i in the communication graph. In addition, for each
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, rii is symmetric positive definite and
strictly diagonally dominant. The objective function in (73)
can be treated as a cost that motivates the sensors to keep
connectivity with their neighbors. However, in this paper, we
consider the following global objective:
lgi (x) =
∑
j∈Np
i
cij ||xi − xj ||2, (74)
where N pi denotes the physical neighboring set of sensor
i. This basically means that if sensor j ∈ N pi , then, the
objective function of sensor i depends on the position of
sensor j but sensor j is not necessarily a neighbor of sensor i
in the communication graph. The modification is reasoned
as follows. If sensor j, where j ∈ N pi , is a neighbor of
sensor i in the communication graph, then, the corresponding
term ||xi − xj ||2 denotes the willingness of sensor i to keep
its connectivity with sensor j. Else if sensor j, where j ∈
N pi , is not a neighbor of sensor i in the communication
graph, the corresponding term ||xi−xj ||2 denotes sensor i’s
willingness to get closer to sensor j (such that it may have
a new connection to sensor j). By such a modification, the
objective function in (73) can be treated as a special case of
(74) by enforcing N pi = Ni.
In the following, we consider a network of sensors in
which sensor i’s objective function is
fi(x) = l
c
i (xi) + l
g
i (x). (75)
Suppose that the sensors’ dynamics are governed by
x˙i = ui + di(t), (76)
and the control strategies are given in (8)-(9) (by directly
adapting ui, zˆi, xˆi therein to two-dimensional column vec-
tors). Then, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 2: Suppose that Assumptions 3-4 are satisfied.
Then, for any positive constant v1, there exist positive con-
stants θ∗, σ∗ such that for each θ ∈ (θ∗,∞), σ ∈ (σ∗,∞),
there exists a constant T¯ ≥ t0 such that
||E(t)|| ≤ v1, ∀t > T¯ . (77)
Proof: Define
R =


2r11 + h11 C12 · · · C1N
C21 2r22 + h22 · · · C2N
...
...
. . .
...
CN1 CN2 · · · 2rNN + hNN

 ,
where hii =
[
2
∑
j∈Np
i
cij 0
0 2
∑
j∈Np
i
cij
]
, Cij =[ −2cij 0
0 −2cij
]
, cij = 0 if j /∈ N pi , and cij > 0 if j ∈
N pi . Then, it can be easily seen that R is strictly diagonally
dominant with its diagonal elements being positive as rii is
symmetric positive definite and strictly diagonally dominant.
Therefore, there are symmetric positive definite matrices
Γ1,Γ2 that satisfy
Γ1R+RTΓ1 = Γ2, (78)
according to the Gershgorin Circle Theorem and Theorem
4.6 in [18].
The rest of the proof follows the proof of Theorem 1 with
V2 therein replaced by
V2 = η
TPη + ξTΓ1ξ, (79)
and hence, we omit the details here.
Corollary 2 considers the sensor connectivity game by
supposing that the sensors’ dynamics are subject to time-
varying disturbances. In the following, we consider the case
in which the sensors’ dynamics are given by
x˙i = ui + gi(x) + di(t), (80)
and the control strategies are given in (43)-(44) (by directly
adapting ui, zˆi, xˆi therein to two-dimensional column vec-
tors). Then, the following result can be obtained.
Corollary 3: Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 5 are sat-
isfied. Then, for any positive constant v1, there exists
a θ∗(v1) > 0 such that for each θ ∈ (θ∗,∞), there
exists a positive constant cr(v1, θ) such that for ci ∈
(cr,∞), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, there exist positive constants
krs(v1, c), β
r(v1, c) such that for each k
s
i ∈ (krs ,∞) βi ∈
(βr,∞), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N},
Ef (t)→ 0 as t→∞ (81)
given that ||E(t0)|| ≤ v1.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2
by replacing V4 therein with
V4 = ξ
TΓ1ξ, (82)
where Γ1 is defined in the proof of Corollary 2.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we consider a network of 5 players
equipped with the communication graph given in Fig. 1. In
the following, we will simulate the connectivity control game
and a non-quadratic game, successively.
1
4
2
3
5
Fig. 1: The communication graph in the numerical examples.
A. Connectivity control of sensor networks
Example 1: Consider the connectivity control game in
(75) in which rii =
[
i 0
0 i
]
, ri = [i i]
T , bi = i. In
addition,
lg1(x) =||x1 − x2||2
lg2(x) =||x2 − x3||2
lg3(x) =||x3 − x2||2
lg4(x) =||x4 − x2||2 + ||x4 − x5||2
lg5(x) =||x5 − x1||2.
(83)
The game has a unique Nash equilibrium on which x∗ij = − 12
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, j ∈ {1, 2}.
In the following, we will firstly simulate the case in which
the sensors’ dynamics are subject to disturbances only, fol-
lowed by the case in which the sensors’ dynamics are subject
to both un-modeled terms and time-varying disturbances.
1) Sensors subject to external disturbances in their dy-
namics: Suppose that the sensors’ dynamics are given by
x˙i = ui + di(t), (84)
and the external disturbance of sensor i is a sinusoidal
function that is of amplitude i and frequency i.
Initialized at x(0) =
[−10, 2,−3,−8,−5, 6, 0,−8,−1, 10]T, the simulation
results are given in Figs. 2-4 by utilizing the method
in (8)-(9). From Fig. 2, it can be concluded that the
sensors’ positions converge to a small neighborhood of
the Nash equilibrium. The position observation errors and
the disturbance observation errors are given in Figs. 3-4
from which we see that the error signals converge to a
small neighborhood of zero. Hence, the effectiveness of the
proposed method in (8)-(9) is verified.
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Fig. 2: The trajectories of the sensors’ positions produced by
(8)-(9).
2) Sensors subject to both un-modeled and disturbance
terms in their dynamics: In this section, we suppose that
x˙i = ui + gi(x) + di(t). (85)
In the dynamics of xij for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, j ∈ {1, 2},
the un-modeled and disturbance terms (i.e., gi(x) + di(t))
are sin(t) + x21, sin(t) + x22, 2 sin(2t) + x
2
11 +
x31, 2 sin(2t) + x22, 3 sin(3t) + x31, 3 sin(3t) +
x32, 4 sin(4t) + x41, 4 sin(4t) + x42, 5 sin(5t) + x51,
and 5 sin(5t) + x52, respectively. With x(0) =
[−10, 2,−3,−8,−5, 6, 0,−8,−1, 10]T, the simulation
results are presented in Figs. 5-7 by utilizing the method
in (43)-(44). Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the sensors’
positions. Figs. 6-7 illustrate the observation errors in
which Fig. 6 shows the position observation errors and
Fig. 7 depicts the observation errors of the un-modeled
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Fig. 3: The position observation errors.
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Fig. 4: The disturbance observation errors.
and disturbance terms. The simulation results demonstrate
that driven by the proposed method, the sensors’ positions
would converge to the Nash equilibrium.
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Fig. 5: The trajectories of the sensors’ positions produced by
(43)-(44).
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Fig. 6: The position observation errors.
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Fig. 7: The un-modeled dynamics and disturbance term
observation errors.
B. Games with non-quadratic cost functions
Example 2: The example settings are the same as those
in Example 1 except that
f1(x) = x
T
1 x1+x11+x12+1+10e
x11+ ||x1−x2||2. (86)
Through direct calculation, x∗ =
[−1.2304,−0.5,−0.5,−0.5,−0.5,−0.5,−0.5203,−0.5,
−0.6217,−0.5]T .
1) Games with disturbances in the players’ dynamics:
The simulation settings are the same as those in Section
VI-A.1. The simulation results produced by the method in
(8)-(9) are given in Figs. 8-10. Fig. 8 illustrates the players’
actions from which we see that the players’ actions are driven
to a small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
the observation errors tend to zero as shown in Figs. 9-
10. The simulation results verify the theoretical result in
Theorem 1.
2) Games with un-modeled and disturbance terms in the
players’ dynamics: In this section, the simulation settings
follow those in Section VI-A.2. The simulation results pro-
duced by (43)-(44) are presented in Figs. 11-13, which plot
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Fig. 8: The trajectories of the players’ actions produced by
(8)-(9).
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Fig. 9: The action observation errors.
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Fig. 10: The disturbance observation errors.
the players’ trajectories, their action observation errors and
their un-modeled and disturbance term observation errors,
respectively. From the simulation results, we see that the
observation errors go to zero as t → ∞ and the players’
actions tend to the Nash equilibrium thus validating the
method in (43)-(44).
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Fig. 11: The trajectories of the players’ actions produced by
(43)-(44).
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Fig. 12: The action observation errors.
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Fig. 13: The un-modeled dynamics and disturbance term
observation errors.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers robust Nash equilibrium seeking for
games in which there are un-modeled and disturbance terms
in the players’ dynamics. To accommodate the un-modeled
and disturbance terms, two extended-state observers are in-
troduced into the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strat-
egy. The first observer is based on PI control. By utilizing
the PI-based observer, it is shown that the proposed method
can drive the players’ actions to a small neighborhood of
the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, to further enhance the
convergence result, a RISE-based observer is employed in the
distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy. By Lyapunov
stability analysis, it is proven that the method can drive the
players’ actions to the Nash equilibrium asymptotically under
certain conditions. Lastly, the proposed method is applied to
the connectivity control of mobile sensor networks.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Ye, G. Hu, “Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking by a consensus
based approach,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 62,
no. 9, pp. 4811-4818, 2017.
[2] K. Ma, G. Hu, C.J. Spanos, “Distributed energy consumption control
via real-time pricing feedback in smart grid,” IEEE Transactions on
Control Systems Technology, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 1907-1914, 2014.
[3] M. Ye, G. Hu, and F. Lewis, “Nash Equilibrium seeking for N-coalition
non-cooperative games,” Automatica, vol. 95, pp. 266-272, 2018.
[4] J. Koshal, A. Nedic and U. Shanbhag, “Distributed algorithms for
aggregative games on graphs,” Operations Research, vol. 64, pp. 680-
704, 2016.
[5] F. Salehisadaghiani and L. Pavel, “Distributed Nash equilibrium seek-
ing: A gossip-based algorithm,” Automatica, vol. 72, pp. 209-216,
2016.
[6] G. Belgioioso and S. Grammatico, “Semi-decentralized Nash equilib-
rium seeking in aggregative games with separable coupling constraints
and non-differentiable cost functions,” IEEE Control Systems Letters,
vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 400-405, 2017.
[7] M. Zhu, and E. Frazzoli, “Distributed robust adaptive equilibrium
computation for generalized convex games,” Automatica, vol. 63, pp.
82-91, 2016.
[8] M. Ye, G. Hu, “Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking in multi-agent
games under switching communication topologies,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Cybernetics, vol. 48, no. 11, pp. 3208-3217, 2018.
[9] M. Ye, G. Hu, “Solving potential games with dynamical constraint,”
IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, vol. 46, no. 5, pp. 1156-1164,
2016.
[10] Q. Zheng, L. Dong, D. Lee and Z. Gao, “Active disturbance rejec-
tion control for MEMS gyroscopes,” IEEE Transactions on Control
Systems Technology, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 1432-1438, 2009.
[11] J. Yao, W. Deng and Z. Jiao, “RISE-based adaptive control of
hydraulic systems with asymptotic tracking,” IEEE Transactions on
Automation Science and Engineering, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 1524-1531,
2017.
[12] A. Fazeli, M. Zeinali and A. Khajepour, “Applications of adaptive slid-
ing mode control for regenerative braking torque control,” IEEE/ASME
Transactions on Mechatronics, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 745-755, 2012.
[13] Y. Yuan, Y. Yu and L. Guo, “Nonlinear active disturbance rejection
control for the pneumatic muscle actuators with discrete-time mea-
surements,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 66, no.
3, pp. 2044-2053, 2019.
[14] S. He, S. Dai and F. Luo, “Asymptotic trajectory tracking control with
guaranteed transient behavior for MSV with uncertain dynamics and
external disturbances,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics,
vol. 66, pp. 3712-3720, no. 5, 2019.
[15] M. Ye, G. Hu, “A robust extremum seeking scheme for dynamic
systems with uncertainties and disturbances,” Automatica, vol. 66, pp.
172-178, 2016.
[16] G. Hu, “Robust consensus tracking of a class of second-order multi-
agent dynamic systems,” Systems and Control Letters, vo. 61, no. 1,
pp. 134-142, 2012.
[17] B. Xian, D. M. Dawson, M. S. de Queiroz, and J. Chen, “A continuous
asymptotic tracking control strategy for uncertain nonlinear systems,”
IEEE Transactions Automatic Control, vol. 49, no. 7, pp. 1206-1211,
2004.
[18] H. Khailil, Nonlinear Systems, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
2002.
[19] M. Ye, G. Hu, “Distributed extremum seeking for constrained net-
worked optimization and its application to energy consumption control
in smart grid,” IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, vol.
24, no. 6, pp. 2048-2058, 2016.
[20] M. Stankovic, K. Johansson and D. Stipanovic, “Distributed seeking
of Nash equilibria with applications to mobile sensor networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 904-919, 2012.
